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By Dr. Ewan Kirk, School of law, Birmingham City University 
On Wednesday evening, Theresa May confirmed that the Cabinet had 
agreed on the Withdrawal Agreement concluded with the EU 
negotiators. However, the following morning, the likelihood of this 
agreement passing Parliament’s scrutiny was diminished by a number 
of resignations from the government, all of whom stated that they 
were unable to support the deal that had been negotiated. 
This therefore leads to questions about what is the most likely 
outcome at this stage. Whereas Theresa May could have thought that 
the chances of the deal agreed being approved and passed by the UK 
Parliament had increased after Wednesday night’s Cabinet meeting, 
some remain supporters might have also thought that the chances of 
‘no Brexit’ had increased the morning after with the ministerial 
resignations. 
The potential outcomes of this situation appear at this stage to be: (1) 
the deal as agreed with the EU negotiators, (2) exiting the EU with no 
deal, and (3) not exiting the EU. Previously only ‘deal’ or ‘no deal’ had 
been countenanced as outcomes by the UK Government, but the 
‘third way’ appears to have been confirmed to the press for the first 
time on the steps of 10 Downing Street by the Prime Minister, who 
confirmed that the only alternatives to the deal, as she saw it, were no 
deal, or no Brexit. 
The deal 
Agreement of Cabinet has been secured. The resignations that have 
occurred since then do not in any legal sense affect this, as 
resignations are as a result of the convention of Ministerial 
Responsibility – the idea that a member of the Government is 
collectively responsible for Government policy (which the Withdrawal 
Agreement now is since the Cabinet Meeting) – and therefore you 
cannot be a member of the Government if you disagree with it. It is 
more of a political issue for the Prime Minister. The next stage is 
approval at the summit due on 25th November, with the governments 
of the EU27, and then it will need to go to the UK Parliament for a 
vote and the passing of the relevant bill to put it into effect. It then 
ultimately must be approved by the European Parliament and then by 
the EU Council by Qualified Majority Vote. Providing all of these 
things occur, then the UK will leave on the 29th of March 2019 in line 
with the European Union (Withdrawal) Act. The point that may cause 
an issue here is, after the statements by politicians of all the different 
parties since publication of the Withdrawal Agreement, whether the 
deal will pass in the UK Parliament. All other steps appear to be 
straightforward, particularly as the EU and the EU27 seem to have 
adopted a ‘sad to see you go, but let’s make this as painless as 
possible for us all’ approach to the Withdrawal Agreement. As long as 
the EU’s stated objectives on Northern Ireland, EU Citizens and the 
monetary settlement have been met, it is likely to be approved. 
REPORT THIS ADPRIVACY SETTINGS 
No deal 
The preferred approach of Conservative MPs who are members of the 
European Research Group (ERG), this is the only outcome which, in 
the absence of any other actions, will definitely happen. The triggering 
of the Article 50 TEU notice period means that by default of operation 
of law, the UK will cease to be a Member State of the EU after the 
29th of March 2019. This will therefore only be avoided if some form of 
positive action is taken by the UK Parliament to implement some other 
outcome, whether that be to approve the Government’s deal, or to 
carry out actions which would withdraw the notification of Article 50 
TEU. This is accepted by the Government’s own studies to be the 
most economically damaging of the outcomes available. MPs will be 
concerned about their own responsibility for allowing this to happen, 
and many have spoken out against it. However, its position as the 
default makes it a very real possibility. 
No Brexit 
This was mentioned for the first time by Theresa May in her statement 
to the press after the Cabinet agreement on Wednesday night. It is 
the other possible alternative outcome to the ‘deal’, whether it is by 
action of the Government, Parliament, or a public vote on the 
Government’s deal. This is where statements made by politicians and 
others have been a little misleading about the possibility of this 
outcome. When Theresa May, or Jeremy Corbyn, have stated that ‘no 
Brexit’ is not possible, they have of course been talking in political 
terms, and not legal ones. The sovereignty of Parliament means that it 
has the unfettered ability to make law in the UK, and therefore it is 
entirely legally possible for it to take action to attempt to withdraw 
Article 50 TEU notification and remain a Member of the EU, as long 
as this is before 11pm on the 29th March 2019. Time is therefore the 
main obstacle here. Politically it may not be possible due to the stated 
policy of the Government, or the willingness of MPs to vote for it, but 
sometimes the way that this has been implied in some quarters as a 
legal impossibility is somewhat misleading. Whether the UK can 
withdraw Article 50 TEU notification unilaterally is a question currently 
pending in the CJEU, and will be answered by the Court in the case 
of Wightman and others v Secretary of State for Exiting the EU Case 
621/18 on the 27th of November, (it was approved for the expedited 
procedure under Article 267 TFEU last month). If it cannot, then 
notification can still be withdrawn with the approval of the EU27, and 
statements by Heads of Government of the EU27 have indicated that 
they would be open to this possibility, albeit most likely with some 
concessions in return. 
REPORT THIS ADPRIVACY SETTINGS 
So where does this leave us? The crucial point, as mentioned above, 
is the vote in the UK Parliament and the EU Withdrawal Agreement 
Bill. If it passes, then the UK will exit the EU ‘in an orderly fashion’, 
and it will then lead to the opening of negotiations post-March 2019 on 
the agreement on a future relationship between the UK and EU. This 
must be completed in time to come into effect at the end of the 
transition period. The Withdrawal Agreement does not make it 100% 
certain as to when this will be, due to the mechanism for extension in 
Article 132 of the agreement not yet having an agreed end date. 
(Article 132 says “up to [31 December 20XX].”) 
The interesting issue here is that supporters of ‘no deal’ and ‘no 
Brexit’ each have to face the fact that in order to advance their own 
causes, they would also each have to make the outcome that they 
desire least, more likely. Both of these outcomes require the rejection 
of the deal by the UK Parliament, in order for the other possibilities to 
come into play. If Parliament rejects the deal, then it would have to 
decide what to do next. If it does nothing, then the UK leaves with no 
deal. However due to the lack of a majority in Parliament in favour of 
this outcome, and the potential damage to the UK’s interests, this 
reduces the likelihood that Parliament would just ‘sit on its hands’ until 
29th March 2019. However, if the 48 letters to the 1922 Committee are 
delivered, then a possible Conservative Party leadership contest 
could provide enough of a diversion to de-rail the programme of 
approval that the Withdrawal Agreement needs to go through. 
This does not make ‘no Brexit’ more likely though, as there is also not 
the required majority for unilaterally revoking the Article 50 TEU 
notification either. Although the majority of MPs at the time of the 
referendum were declared as Remain supporters, many have 
subsequently pledged to respect the referendum vote against their 
own personal views. Parliament could instead decide to seek the view 
of the public through another referendum vote, this time on the deal 
as agreed by the Government. This could be done either as a 
condition of approval of the Government’s deal (i.e. Parliament makes 
approval conditional upon the public vote) or as a ‘what do we do 
next?’ question as a result of a stalemate in Parliament that rejects 
the deal. Received wisdom states that to run a referendum including 
formulating the question, running campaigns, etc would require a 
period of 6 months, and therefore an extension of the Article 50 TEU 
period would be required. The approval of the EU27 is required in 
order for this to happen, although there appears to be a prevailing 
opinion that this would be granted for a referendum. (This would be 
thrown into doubt if ‘no deal’ was an option, mainly because it would 
be against the economic interests of the EU27). However, legally, it is 
an option – whether it is politically an option is a matter for the parties 
in Westminster to decide. 
 
